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In his award-winning book, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in 
American History,1 John Fabian Witt examines how the Lincoln 
administration charted a novel legal course by adopting codified laws of 
war for the Union armies—“Instruction for the Government of Armies of 
the United States in the Field” or “Lincoln’s Code”—which shaped the 
meaning of emancipation, the Union’s broader military policy, and 
international law thereafter—i.e., the Geneva Convention. The magnitude 
of violence during Civil War campaigns and the dilemma of how the war 
would affect the institution of slavery had undercut the relevance of mid-
19th century laws of war orthodoxy—as used herein, “laws of war 
orthodoxy” or “orthodox laws of war”—for the Lincoln administration, 
prompting a reevaluation of those laws ending with Lincoln’s Code. The 
premium placed by orthodox laws of war on bright-line rules to govern 
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battles between professional soldiers—as used herein, “conventional 
combat”—seemed ill-suited to the Civil War by the end of its second year. 
No comprehensive body of regulatory or statutory laws of war existed 
prior to Lincoln’s Code. Laws of war in 1861 meant the general consensus 
regarding the proper conduct of warfare—and corresponding punishments 
for infractions thereof—that precepts from domestic and international 
scholars formed, dominated by laws of war orthodoxy, and a collection of 
military regulations dominated.2 Lincoln’s Code generally marked a 
formulistic point of departure from laws of war before that time as a 
government document purporting to comprehensively codify laws of war. 
Lincoln’s Code departed from laws of war orthodoxy substantively, 
notably in the Code’s development of the concept of military necessity—
                                                                                                             
 2. This Article refers to prevailing 18th and early 19th century laws of war 
theory, as expounded by Witt, as “orthodoxy” or “orthodox laws of war.” “The 
laws of war” refers to the approximate consensus at any given time as to the 
precepts of government adopted rules or regulations governing military conduct, 
shaping what constitutes acceptable or legal conduct distinct from conduct 
punishable as in violation by the laws of war or by civil authorities. By the end of 
the Civil War, orthodoxy no longer predominated the laws of war. Witt presents 
Emer de Vattel as the father of this movement as Vattel’s “The Law of Nations” 
crystallized the “limited war” spirit of the age. The “limited war” spirit 
represented a belief that enlightenment humanitarianism should constrain wars to 
diminish the ravages of war. Pursuant to the orthodox paradigm, war between 
civilized nations would not devolve into destructive struggles that wreaked havoc 
on nations’ populations and prosperity if nations opted to abide by morally neutral 
black letter rules. Reflecting and shaping military customs of the day, the rules 
Vattel and likeminded jurists propagated proscribed violence against civilians, 
killing outside the field of battle—i.e., by assassination, poisoning, using false 
uniforms to trick enemy soldiers—and violence against a surrendered enemy, 
collectively intended to result in “moderate” and “gentle” wars whereby most 
were exempt from the wars’ rigors. Treatises such as those Benjamin Franklin 
supported to abolish the rights of plunder and pillage, sought to effectuate laws of 
war orthodoxy ideals in America. Violence was the province of professional 
uniformed soldiers under a sovereign nation state’s direction engaged in set-piece 
battles in pursuit of limited national goals. Combatants without uniforms—
thereby not representing a state—or participating in combat outside set-piece 
battles outside the guidance of a sovereign’s authorized officers, called 
“conventional combat,” fell outside the convention of Vattellian laws of war so 
were not party to the benefits such laws of war afforded soldiers to limit war’s 
brutality. Those participating in unconventional conflict threatened the civilized 
limited war paradigm ordered by clearly and easily applied bright line rules that 
reduced carnage and ensured the safety of mankind, and because they threatened 
the rules meant to preserve humanitarian order did not enjoy the privileges of its 
protection, such as prisoner exchange. Id. at 16–23, 44–45, 94. 




the justified use of methods outside those accepted by, or in violation of, 
laws of war only as far as necessary to rationally advance a nation’s war 
goals, and sooner end conflict. In Witt’s account, the Confederacy did not 
engage to adapt laws of war to the Civil War’s contingency, as he 
concludes, they “had no need to produce a new chapter in the laws of war,” 
because “their aim was not to transform those laws but to embrace them 
in the form they had taken since the earliest days of the republic.”3 
Witt mischaracterizes the Confederate leadership as champions of 
laws of war orthodoxy. The history of the Partisan Ranger Act (“PRA”), 
whereby the Confederacy commissioned combatants for unconventional 
war, illustrates the Confederate leadership’s willingness to adapt laws of 
war orthodoxy to address the Civil War’s contingencies. Through the 
PRA, Confederate leaders effectively sought to broaden the scope of 
legally acceptable combat to accommodate the evolving reality of 
unconventional violence in the form of widespread guerrilla activity. 
Witt’s narrative, and one’s understanding of the laws of war after the 19th 
century, are more comprehensive if one addresses how the Confederacy’s 
leadership experimented with similar legal forms as its Northern 
counterparts. Specifically, military necessity provided the motivation for 
the PRA’s enactment and repeal.  
The PRA was meant to channel unrestrained and unconventional 
violence from the amorphous unproductive form outside the purview of 
government control into a form that, Confederate leaders hoped, would 
rationally advance the Confederacy’s war goals. The PRA’s proponents 
endeavored to navigate carefully between the Scylla of promoting 
widespread unconventional violence and Charybdis of doing nothing, 
letting guerrilla activity proliferate unrestrained. When partisan rangers’ 
military failures no longer rationally advanced the Confederacy’s war 
goals, the Confederate leadership reverted to the prevailing orthodox 
position that unconventional combatants were not soldiers under the laws 
of war. Through the PRA, Confederate leaders put a central theme of 
Lincoln’s Code into practice. Parallels exist between how the Northern 
and Southern leaderships experimented with promoting new forms of 
military activity. These experiments reciprocally interacted in an ongoing 
legal discussion throughout the war. 
The reaction to the PRA informed a variety of Union policies, 
affecting the treatment of Southern civilians and discussions on 
Confederate sovereignty and collectively engendering legal uncertainty 
amongst Union military leaders that resulted in the promulgation of 
Lincoln’s Code. Partisan rangers’ status problematized Union policies that 
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treated all unconventional combatants as guerillas and the scope of 
military jurisdiction in occupied states. Officers were forced to decide 
whether to treat partisan rangers as soldiers or as criminals and to 
determine the appropriate jurisdiction if partisan rangers were criminals. 
These decisions included the grander question of whether Union 
commanders should accept the Confederacy’s interpretation of the laws of 
war, a departure from the prevailing understanding of laws of war 
orthodoxy. The presumption that Union commanders would recognize 
partisan rangers as soldiers under the laws of war was effectively the 
Confederacy’s claim of sovereign authority to revise laws of war and a 
demand that Union leaders recognize that sovereign prerogative. The 
officers’ response to this dilemma varied greatly; many maintained the 
right, pointing to the prevailing orthodox position on unconventional 
combatants, to bring partisan rangers before a military commission to be 
tried and executed as guerrillas or “bushwhackers.”  
To combat what Union commanders understood to be a breach in the 
laws of war by supporting unconventional combatants, such commanders 
justified an increasingly destructive policy of retaliation against civilians 
and propelled the Civil War into a more destructive and desperate conflict. 
Uncertainty over how to treat captured unconventional combatants and 
combat them in the field prompted the Lincoln administration to engage 
Francis Lieber, a noted legal scholar, to provide guidance. Lieber 
responded with a treatise on unconventional combatants, winning him 
gravitas with the administration; this appreciation translated into Lieber’s 
appointment as the principal drafter of Lincoln’s Code. Both the treatise 
and Lincoln’s Code entitled partisan rangers to the same privileges as 
conventional soldiers under the laws of war and rebuked the Union 
officers’ prevailing orthodox position.  
Witt is not alone in passing over the PRA’s import. Although a 
growing body of scholarship centers on unconventional or guerrilla 
warfare in the Civil War, relatively little scholarship exists on the PRA 
and its legal implications. Coverage of unconventional warfare in the Civil 
War scholarship shares certain core commonalities. Scholars place great 
emphasis on how experience with unconventional combatants affected 
development of official attitudes on military strategy—i.e., whether to 
hold local civilians accountable by military authorities—and the effect of 
the nearly incomprehensible iterations of unconventional military activity 
on civilians and communities without attention to the PRA.4  
                                                                                                             
 4. Mark Grimsley and Mark Neely explore the Union’s evolving counter-
guerrilla strategies and policies regarding civilians, but neither explores the origins 
of, or Confederate perspective on, partisan ranger action. See MARK GRIMSLEY, THE 




                                                                                                             
HARD HAND OF WAR: UNION MILITARY POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN CIVILIANS 
1861–1865 (1995); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE CIVIL WAR AND THE LIMITS OF 
DESTRUCTION (2007). Grimsley focuses on the interplay of official Union policy, 
combat experience, and informal attitudes of soldiers to explain why Union armies 
adopted a “hard war” to eliminate civilian support for the Confederacy. Grimsley 
defines “hard war” as actions against Southern civilians and property expressly to 
demoralize Southern civilians and the allocation of substantial military resources to 
accomplish the task. See GRIMSLEY, supra. Although acknowledging that guerrillas 
influenced Union policy, neither Grimsley nor Neely would go as far as Clay 
Mountcastle in asserting the impact of guerrillas. See CLAY MOUNTCASTLE, 
PUNITIVE WAR: CONFEDERATE GUERRILLAS AND UNION REPRISALS (2009). 
Mountcastle posits that the Union’s punitive strategy against the South during the 
war’s latter half must be understood as a response to guerrilla activity. To 
supplement quantitative analysis, Mountcastle addresses the psychological effects 
of guerrillas on Union soldiers and the gradual, nonlinear development of attitudes 
that prompted a punitive war. See id. Kenneth Noe investigates the deeply 
embedded cultural animosities between Union soldiers and pro-Confederate 
guerrillas that helped fuel the cycle of violence; Union soldiers deemed the local 
populace in Appalachia their cultural and social inferiors. Kenneth W. Noe, 
Exterminating Savages: The Union Army and Mountain Guerrillas in Southern 
West Virginia, 1861–1862, in THE CIVIL WAR IN APPALACHIA: COLLECTED ESSAYS 
104 (Kenneth W. Noe & Shannon Wilson eds., 1st ed. 1997). Other historians 
employ different analytical lenses to address the Confederate and civilian 
perspectives. Michael Fellman provides insight into the nature of guerrilla war in 
Missouri, particularly the reciprocal actions and policies of Confederate and Union 
leaders to convey the complex breadth of unconventional war’s violence and the 
blurred lines between civilians and combatants, but he treats Missouri as a region 
almost distinct from the rest of the Confederacy. See MICHAEL FELLMAN, INSIDE 
WAR: THE GUERRILLA CONFLICT IN MISSOURI DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
(1989). Stephen V. Ash assesses Confederate civilian responses to Union invasions 
and posits that guerrilla warfare should be understood as an extension of the 
community and southern cultural traditions. See STEPHEN V. ASH, WHEN THE 
YANKEES CAME: CONFLICT AND CHAOS IN THE OCCUPIED SOUTH, 1861–1865 
(1995). Kenneth Noe also examined the socio-economic characteristics of 
guerrillas, finding that the guerrillas were often older and more well-established 
than others had generally believed. Kenneth W. Noe, Who Were the Bushwackers?: 
Age, Class, Kin, and Western Virginia’s Confederate Guerrillas, 1861–1862, in 49 
CIVIL WAR HISTORY no. 1 at 5, 15 (2003). Robert Mackey and Daniel Sutherland 
stand out regarding the Partisan Ranger Act. Mackey argues that Confederate 
leaders embraced unconventional warfare, such as the partisan ranger service, to 
complement the conventional war. Dominant military theory and experiences in the 
Mexican-American War inclined Confederates to view unconventional war as an 
effective military policy. See ROBERT RUSSELL MACKEY, THE UNCIVIL WAR: 
IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE UPPER SOUTH, 1861–1865 (2004). The 
unconventional war effort ultimately failed because of the Union’s ability to adapt 




This Article departs from existing scholarship by examining the PRA 
as a novel expression of competing legal forces in the history of America’s 
laws of war that Witt in Lincoln’s Code identified, but did not explore. 
This Article begins with an overview of unconventional combatants 
standing under orthodox laws of war prior to the Civil War to address 
antecedents for both positive and negative perspectives of the PRA. 
Additionally, this Article addresses how the rapid expansion of 
unconventional combat in the Civil War induced Virginia to raise partisan 
ranger units, previewing the motivations for, and limitations of, the PRA. 
Part II covers the PRA’s passage and how the boundaries of acceptable 
military behavior constrained expectations of partisan rangers, but how 
they were also able to push those boundaries. Part III examines how Union 
perspectives on and responses to the PRA led Union leaders to examine 
laws of war orthodoxy, resulting in Francis Lieber’s engagement and 
Lincoln’s Code. This Article concludes with an analysis of why 
Confederate leaders soured on the use of partisan rangers, repealed the 
PRA, and reverted to the prevailing orthodox position on unconventional 
combatants. 
I. ORIGINS OF THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT 
Conflicting factors and historical trends created an array of attitudes 
about unconventional combatants in mid-19th century America.5 At West 
Point and other military academies, students studied Napoleon’s 
campaigns and were educated in the proper conduct of war by reading the 
European and American standard bearers of laws of war orthodoxy, 
including: Antoine-Henri Jomini in The Art of War; Dennis Hart Mahan 
in Outpost; and Henry W. Halleck in Elements of Military Art and 
Science.6 Such works were produced to guide the conduct and strategy of 
large conventional armies that a centralized government organized and 
                                                                                                             
and implement successful counter-strategies, he argues. Sutherland names factors 
such as the reverence for the American Revolution’s guerrillas and southerner’s 
ties to the locality to explain a widespread preference among border citizens for 
guerrilla over conventional service. See DANIEL E. SUTHERLAND, A SAVAGE 
CONFLICT: THE DECISIVE ROLE OF GUERRILLAS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
(2009). 
 5. See MOUNTCASTLE, supra note 4, at 8–20 (for a survey of the antebellum 
experience with unconventional war). 
 6. ANTONINE-HENRI HOMINI, THE ART OF WAR (1838); DENNIS HART 
MANHAN, ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ADVANCED GUARD, OUTPOSTS, AND 
DETACHMENT SERVICE OF TROOPS (1847); HENRY W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF 
MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE (1846). 




outfitted. As a result, normative expectations of future Civil War leaders 
were shaped by the orthodoxy’s preoccupation with conventional 
campaigns between 18th and early 19th century western European nation 
states rather than a state of war wherein individuals could act outside of 
government authorization and directives. In the orthodox paradigm, the 
protections the laws of war afforded to combatants only extended to 
individuals operating as an arm of the state, which uniforms and military 
bureaucracy denotes.  
Combat that government-commissioned officers did not direct was 
outside the sovereign’s control, incidentally eroding a sovereign’s 
prerogative to direct violence to accomplish state goals. Such warfare, 
therefore, fell outside the prevailing understanding of the boundaries of 
18th and early 19th century orthodox laws of war because unconventional 
combat raised the specter of individuals’ unchecked emotion and chaos. 
Because unconventional warfare resembled criminality, adherents of 
orthodoxy generally viewed it as illegal; the state could execute 
unconventional combatants as bandits or murderers under military or civil 
law.7 
Unconventional combat was not, however, understood to be wholly 
outside the boundaries of European laws of war orthodoxy, and even less 
so from the American variant thereof.8 Various European legal scholars 
                                                                                                             
 7. Vattel, for example, forbade citizens from waging unconventional 
warfare outright. HENRY HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE, 
OR, COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN STRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF 
BATTLES, ETC. 37 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1860); STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR 
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 163 (2005); EMMERICH DE 
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 399–400 
(London, G.G. & J. Robinson eds., rev. ed. 1797). 
 8. The American variant diverged from the European in the sacrosanct 
treatment of property rights—i.e., by Jurist James Kent, roughly the analogue of 
Vattel in this space—and experience with non-white combatants. The latter 
profoundly influenced attitudes about partisan rangers. Experience during the 
Revolution with Native Americans and Mexican guerrillas who fought outside the 
scope of European laws of war orthodoxy forced American military minds to 
grapple with the practicality of European laws of war orthodoxy when combating 
those who did not fight by European convention. This experience set a 
contradictory precedent by which American military men understood the utility 
of unconventional tactics, which Americans employed with effect against the 
British during the Revolution and Native Americans, but also instituted a novel 
and harsh response to punish unconventional combatants, such as the institution 
of commissions to treat punish Mexican guerrillas as criminals, which Witt points 
out, gave life to the idea of a war crime. WITT, supra note 1, at 71, 90, 107, 122–




developed regimes for unconventional combatants. Two notable Prussian 
officers produced texts—Johann von Ewald’s Treatise on the Small War 
and Andreas Emmerich’s The Partisan in War or the Use of a Corps of 
Light Troops for an Army9—covering unconventional war and the utility 
of “partisans” after serving in the British army during the American 
Revolution. In conventional 18th and early 19th century armies, light 
cavalry or infantry sometimes operated in a gray zone between 
conventional and unconventional combat by surprising enemy supply 
posts in quick lightning attacks or scouting behind enemy lines; such 
conduct was not considered a breach of laws of war orthodoxy.  
Examples of unconventional combat are prominently in American 
military heritage. Even if reared on European laws of war orthodoxy, the 
nature of pre-Civil War military conflicts—particularly conflicts with 
Native Americans—forced familiarity with and respect for the efficacy of 
unconventional war amongst many American military men. Experience 
reinforced the prevailing orthodox position’s antipathy for unconventional 
combat for some but convinced others of its efficacy.10 Exploits of 
                                                                                                             
24, 130. Witt briefly acknowledges the PRA represented a novel amendment to 
laws of war orthodoxy, writing: 
[T]he official Confederate embrace of partisan rangers in the spring of 
1862 revealed a potential flaw in the orthodox Enlightenment approach. 
For what the Confederacy had shown in the Partisan Ranger Act was that 
a belligerent could very easily extend commissions to irregulars and thus 
give them the status of soldiers deserving prisoner of war treatment. 
Id. at 192. 
 9. JOHANN VON EWALD, TREATISE ON THE SMALL WAR (1790); ANDREAS 
EMMERICH, THE PARTISAN IN WAR OR THE USE OF A CORPS OF LIGHT TROOPS FOR 
AN ARMY (1789). 
 10. The U.S. Army developed an array of procedures to battle unconventional 
combat of Native Americans. Early colonists abandoned European style warfare 
to adopt the combat methods of their Native American foes; both sides engaged 
in surprise raids, attacks on settlements, and destruction of civilian supplies. 
Frustrated with the guerrilla tactics the Seminoles employed during the Second 
Seminole War (1835–1842), U.S. commanders, specifically General William J. 
Worth, resorted to destroying entire villages. Only once did the Seminoles face 
U.S. troops in a conventional battle that ended in a disastrous defeat at the battle 
of Okeechobee. U.S. armies under Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott 
encountered stiff guerrilla resistance during the Mexican-American War (1846–
1848). Troops developed strategies to combat the Mexicans. Several future Civil 
War commanders who had served in the U.S. Army understood the threat 
guerrillas posed and were versed in effective counter-guerrilla methods. Only later 
in the Civil War, however, did Union officers adopt the tactics deemed 
appropriate to employ only against the Native American and Mexican enemies to 
combat southerners. MOUNTCASTLE, supra note 4, at 15. 




unconventional units—such as Francis “the Swamp Fox” Marion’s during 
the Revolution—incepted into the American military conscious, 
particularly in the South. A romantic view of unconventional combatants 
normalized unconventional combat in the American South.11  
Precedent and nostalgia shaped Confederate leaders’ understanding of 
the laws of war and made them receptive to employing unconventional 
units. Laws of war—i.e., light cavalry—and practical—i.e., Marion’s 
troops—precedents substantiated an argument that because partisan 
rangers were government-authorized, organized, and disciplined, partisan 
rangers were essentially fungible with conventional soldiers. Since 
partisan rangers functioned in most respects like conventional soldiers, the 
laws of war should treat partisan rangers as conventional soldiers.12 
Francis Lieber agreed that partisan rangers shared the same rights as 
conventional soldiers, but this was the minority position amongst those 
raised on laws of war orthodoxy, outside the boundaries of the prevailing 
orthodox understanding of the laws of war. By and large, both Union and 
Confederate leaders in early 1861 envisioned the Civil War would unfold 
neatly within the boundaries established for conventional combat. Early 
strategies, therefore, anticipated a short war exclusively conventional 
armies fought on a small scale. The scope and intensity of the 
                                                                                                             
 11. Historian Daniel Sutherland notes, “rebels had a slate of real and fictional 
heroes to document their selective version of the past,” notably popularized by the 
South’s foremost novelist, William Gilmore Simms, who published a biography 
of Francis Marion and historical romances celebrating the South’s Revolutionary 
partisans. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 10. The Revolution’s examples 
influenced future partisan leaders, to which John Mosby attested in his memoirs: 
“I borrowed a copy of the ‘Life of Marion’, which was the first book I read, except 
as a task at school. I remember how I shouted when I read aloud in the nursery of 
the way the great partisan hid in the swamp and outwitted the British.” JOHN S. 
MOSBY, THE MEMOIRS OF COLONEL JOHN S. MOSBY 4 (Charles Wells Russell ed., 
1917). In his romantic novel, The Partisan Leader (1836), Nathaniel Beverley 
Tucker envisioned a war between the North and South and chose a Virginia 
partisan commander as his protagonist. At one point a Virginian points out, “the 
dispositions of the people, and the strong fastnesses of the country, will make it a 
secure retreat to a partisan corps.” NATHANIEL BEVERLY TUCKER, THE PARTISAN 
LEADER 141 (Rev. Thos. A. Ware, ed., Richmond, West & Johnston 1862), 
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL7000928M/The_partisan_leader [https://perma.c 
c/WEX8-E7Y3].  
 12. IAN FREDERICK WILLIAM BECKETT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GUERRILLA 
WARFARE 4 (ABC-CLIO 1999). 




unconventional conflict breaking out along the border-states took leaders 
in both the North and South by surprise.13 
The escalating unconventional violence in western Virginia motivated 
Virginia’s legislature to enact the “Virginia Ranger Act.” The Act, on 
March 27, 1862, authorized the governor, John Letcher, to raise units of 
“rangers” referred to hereinafter as “state rangers.” After Union troops 
drove Confederate forces out of western Virginia in a series of battles in 
the summer of 1861, pro-Confederate unconventional combatants became 
active throughout the region. Employing the raids, ambushes, and terror 
tactics associated with “Indian” fighting and unconventional predecessors 
from the Revolution, such combatants formed units, with names such as 
the “Moccasin Rangers,” to clash with pro-Union unconventional 
combatant bands, with names such as the “Snake Hunters,” civilians, and 
Union soldiers.14  
The resulting non-state-directed guerilla violence troubled Virginia’s 
legislature for two main reasons. First, such violence was often directed 
against civilians incumbent on the government to protect. Second, 
Virginia needed men in conventional service to effectively counter Union 
conventional forces. Necessity is the mother of invention, and the Virginia 
Ranger Act was intended to remedy this situation. The Virginia Ranger 
Act instructed state rangers to offer “the greatest protection to our loyal 
citizens” but harass occupying Union forces by “cutting off their 
marauding and foraging parties.”15 Strategic use of unconventional 
combatants could benefit numerically inferior conventional Confederate 
forces by forcing Union leaders to divert resources from campaigns 
against the Confederate capital in Richmond.16  
                                                                                                             
 13. FELLMAN, supra note 4, at 23. Unconventional combatants did not lend 
themselves to easy categorization. Unionist guerrillas terrorized rebel neighbors; 
rebel guerrillas fought U.S. soldiers; unaffiliated bands used the war as a pretext 
to plunder—oftentimes, the cover of war permitted antebellum adversaries to 
continue family feuds or revisit class antagonisms. The variety of guerrilla 
organizations and extent of the terror they caused defies characterization or 
quantification. Id. at 23–29. 
 14. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 31. 
 15. RANDALL OSBORNE & JEFFREY WEAVER, THE VIRGINIA STATE RANGERS 
AND STATE LINE 4–5 (1994); An Act to authorize the organization of ten or more 
Companies of Rangers, ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 1861–62 (1862) [hereinafter VSRA], https://babel 
.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101073363317;view=1up;seq=57 [https://perma.c 
c/E6NC-8AT3]. 
 16. Mosby stated that “the military value of the species of warfare I have 
waged is not measured by the number of prisoners and material of war captured 
from the enemy, but by the heavy detail it has already compelled him to make.” 




The Virginia Legislature saw unconventional combatants as a 
resource to supplement conventional forces and consequently mandated 
state rangers to coordinate with conventional troops.17 The Virginia 
Ranger Act proscribed recruitment only in areas under Union control, 
revealing the Virginia legislators’ intent that state rangers would be a 
limited instrument to utilize citizens who could not, or would not, serve in 
the conventional Confederate army.18 Recruitment could not interfere with 
or impair “the laws providing for the quota of Virginia to the Confederate 
Army.”19 Nevertheless, either as state rangers or guerillas, men flocked to 
                                                                                                             
MOSBY, supra note 11, at 262. The threat of guerrilla attacks forced Union forces 
to divert resources from campaigning armies, a boon for the numerically inferior 
Confederate armies. Letcher complained to a friend about the encroaching Union 
armies in Virginia, the ranger service could help keep some Northern troops away 
from Richmond. F. N. BONEY, JOHN LETCHER OF VIRGINIA: THE STORY OF 
VIRGINIA’S CIVIL WAR GOVERNOR 158 (U. Ala. Press 1966).  
 17. In the war’s opening months, Turner Ashby demonstrated in Virginia that 
a disciplined unconventional unit could operate productively and cooperate with 
conventional forces; a cavalry Colonel in the conventional army reporting to the 
Secretary of War: “I need not speak of his qualities, for already he is known as 
one of the best partisan leaders in the service.” This same cavalry officer offered 
a promising vision of employing partisan rangers and utilizing unconventional 
warfare to the Secretary of War, reporting that amongst the companies he 
assembled, “are some of the very best for the peculiar services of partisan and 
border war.” Later he glowingly referred to Captain Ashby: “I need not speak of 
his qualities, for already he is known as one of the best partisan leaders in the 
service.” 2 U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION 
OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, 
953–54 (1880) [hereinafter WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I], https://hdl.handle 
.net/2027/mdp.49015002000108 [https://perma.cc/NET9-WTNV]. Ashby and 
his “mountain rangers” operated near Harpers Ferry until Major General Joseph 
E. Johnston promoted him to lieutenant colonel of the 7th Virginia Cavalry. 
During the winter of 1861–1862, Ashby engaged in unconventional activities, 
seeking to inflict as much damage as possible on the Chesapeake and Ohio canals, 
a major Union supply route. Ashby, however, also served as Major General 
Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s de facto cavalry commander during the spring 
of 1862 Valley campaign, operating as a conventional cavalry commander; he 
covered Jackson’s retreat after the Battle of Kernstown on March 23, 1862. 
MILLARD K. BUSHONG, GENERAL TURNER ASHBY & STONEWALL’S VALLEY 
CAMPAIGN 34–36, 59, 99, 107 (1980). Ashby exemplifies the dual role that 
Confederate commanders later expected partisan rangers to play. Like Ashby, 
partisans were to engage in guerrilla style warfare, but operate in conjunction 
with, and nominally as, conventional military forces. 
 18. VSRA, supra note 15, § 3. 
 19. Id.  




unconventional service to avoid conventional service, to the chagrin of 
army officers.20 For Governor Letcher, the state rangers performed a vital 
service by protecting his constituents. The Virginia Ranger Act specified 
that the government would protect “loyal” citizens, which presumably did 
not include “disloyal” unionists. As many “loyal” Virginia men had left 
home to join the Confederate Army, Governor Letcher expected local 
militia and state rangers to defend loyal women and children against 
Northern invaders and disloyal Virginians.21 
The manner in which state rangers’ organization and instructions 
dovetailed with those of conventional service signals the intention that the 
Virginia Ranger Act not drastically depart from orthodoxy. The state 
outfitted, paid, and organized the state rangers in the same way as soldiers 
in the Confederate army.22 The Virginia Ranger Act prescribed rangers 
“conform their operations to the usages of civilized warfare” with the 
cryptic condition that “the enemy on their part shall conduct the war 
according to the usages of civilized war.”23 Although state rangers 
reported directly to Governor Letcher, the Virginia Ranger Act provided 
they obey Confederate Army officers to maximize synergies of joint 
unconventional and conventional operations; state rangers were to act in 
parallel with, but more discreetly than, the conventional Confederate 
cavalry.24 The exegesis of the Virginia Ranger Act was, paradoxically, that 
in order to remediate the intractable guerrilla conflict’s breach of laws of 
war orthodoxy, Confederate leaders sought to harness unconventional 
combatants on a heretofore unknown scale. The Virginia Ranger Act 
thereby shifted the boundaries of the laws of war away from the prevailing 
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orthodox position. Whether this boundary shift was a conscious decision 
to adapt laws of war away from orthodoxy or an unconscious perspective 
that laws of war orthodoxy treated partisan rangers as conventional 
soldiers is unknown. The authors of the Virginia Ranger Act, however, 
seemed to expect that Union officials would recognize state rangers as 
conventional soldiers under orthodox laws of war. As long as state rangers 
comported themselves and were organized similarly to conventional 
soldiers, it follows that these parties should be treated similarly under the 
laws of war. The Virginia Ranger Act purported to expand the scope of 
recognized activity under the orthodox laws of war by legitimizing 
unconventional combatants. Union treatment of state rangers and partisan 
rangers as guerillas showed that the Virginia Ranger Act tread on legally 
controversial grounds.  
State rangers were conceptually and legally distinguished from 
guerillas because the Virginia Ranger Act obligated state rangers to 
operate in formal military units with a clear command structure in 
connection with, and by the orders of, conventional units.25 Guerrillas 
engaged in combat on their own volition—often using war as an excuse to 
settle old scores—without government authority or oversight. In some 
ways, state rangers resembled French and Indian or Revolutionary War’s 
light infantry companies, which laws of war orthodoxy recognized as 
soldiers.26 
State rangers did not have the desired military impact. They generally 
conducted themselves similarly to guerrillas, neither cooperating effectively 
with conventional forces nor behaving as disciplined conventional 
soldiers.27 Despondent about the state rangers’ impotence, Confederate 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. §§ 1, 4. 
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 27. In 1861 and early 1862, Governor Letcher received letters advocating for 
greater oversight of state ranger units. G. W. Berlin of Staunton wrote Letcher:  
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military expeditions even into the mountains should be under the 
command of a competent, just and honorable officers. 




Brigadier General Henry Heth scathingly denounced the rangers in a letter 
to Governor Letcher on April 2, 1862: 
I feel it my duty to inform you of certain facts arising from the 
organization of the irregular force known as “rangers,” authorized 
by an act of the Legislature of Virginia. The companies of this 
organization which have come under my observation are simply 
organized bands of robbers and plunderers . . . . Many, especially 
the worthless, like the privilege of fighting, as they say, on their 
own responsibility, which, interpreted, means roaming over the 
country, taking what they want and doing nothing. . . . A guerrilla 
force without being closely watched becomes an organized and 
licensed band of robbers . . . .28 
Heth’s report is an expression of the prevailing orthodox position’s 
antipathy for unconventional combatants. State rangers and guerrillas 
were characterized as little better than criminals, ineligible for the 
privileges the laws of war afford because unconventional combat fell 
outside the realm of legally cognizable combat. Despite Heth’s appeal to 
Governor Letcher, which was a harbinger of later criticisms of the PRA, 
the state rangers’ ranks swelled as men who desired to remain at home 
rather than join the conventional army opted to become state rangers—or 
guerillas—undermining conventional recruitment efforts on the eve of 
major Union offensives anticipated for the spring of 1862.29 
The capture of state rangers forced Union commanders to interpret and 
expound upon the laws of war, setting the stage for ongoing legal disputes 
about the status of unconventional combat and Union occupation policy 
between Confederate and Union authorities. Brigadier General Benjamin 
F. Kelley’s proclamation to the people of Hampshire county and the Upper 
Potomac, dismissing recognition of unconventional combatants in any 
form under the laws of war, was a bellwether for prevailing orthodox 
position: “[I]f you attempt to carry on a guerrilla warfare against my 
troops, by attacking my wagon trains or messengers, or shooting my 
guards or pickets, you will be considered as enemies of your country, and 
treated accordingly.”30 The nomenclature employed to describe 
unconventional combatants as “bushwhackers,” or “marauders”—
                                                                                                             
Letter from G. W. Berlin esq. to John Letcher (July 4, 1862), in CORRESPONDENCE 
JULY-AUGUST 1862, GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA CORRESPONDENCE, VHS. 
 28. Letter from Henry Heth to John Letcher (April 2, 1862), quoted in 
OSBORNE & WEAVER, supra note 15, at 10–11 (emphasis added). 
 29. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 92. 
 30. 5 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, supra note 17, at 638–39. 




carrying a criminal connotation—is telling of why Union authorities were 
adverse to grant state rangers or partisan rangers prisoners of war status.31 
For Governor Letcher, there was no ambiguity. He believed in 
regarding state rangers as conventional soldiers and entitling them to the 
same privileges under the laws of war. When confronted by news that 
Union commanders sought to summarily execute several state rangers, 
Governor Letcher wrote the Confederate Secretary of War advocating 
retaliation: 
[R]egularly commissioned under the law of Virginia in the ranger 
service, have been captured by the enemy and it is announced in 
their papers that they will be hung. If they shall be executed I think 
retaliation should follow promptly. . . . We must let Mr. Lincoln 
understand that for every man of this class who shall be executed 
we will execute in like manner one of corresponding grade 
selected from the prisoners in our custody.32 
If Union commanders violated the laws of war by executing soldiers, 
the Confederacy retaliation was justified for Governor Letcher to force 
recognition of the state rangers’ legal status. Although Governor Letcher 
remained a proponent of using unconventional combatants, he relented to 
pressure from Confederate army officers in August of 1862, including 
General Robert E. Lee, and assigned the state rangers to the Virginia State 
Line, Virginia’s independent militia army.33 The Virginia Ranger Act 
illuminated partisan rangers’ practical limitations and legal baggage, but 
the experiment was enticing enough to Confederate leaders that Congress 
passed the PRA in April 1862. 
II. THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT 
On April 8, 1862, a Confederate congressman from Virginia introduced 
a bill by unanimous consent to raise units of partisan rangers.34 Pursuant to 
the original bill, partisan rangers would receive a commission of five dollars 
for every Union soldier killed, but the Senate Congressional Military 
Committee eliminated that section and then presented a substitute bill in 
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which partisan rangers received the same pay, and were subject to the same 
regulations, as conventional soldiers.35 The House of Representatives 
passed the revised bill on April 19 and the Senate followed suit on April 
21.36 The PRA came into effect as part of General Orders No. 30 the War 
Adjutant and Inspectors Office issued on April 28, 1862.37 Similar to the 
Virginia Ranger Act, partisan ranger officers were granted a commission 
to raise and command independent units, and partisan rangers were 
expected to coordinate with the army.38 Passed concurrently by Congress, 
the Confederate Conscription Act stipulated that applications for partisan 
ranger commissions be directed to conventional army generals, not to the 
War Department, placing partisan rangers service squarely under the 
purview of conventional service.39 Signaling the intention that the PRA 
would govern all authorized unconventional combatants, the Conscription 
Act explicated that no authority existed outside the PRA to raise units for 
guerrilla activity.40 
Like the Virginia Ranger Act, the PRA sought to contain and control 
unconventional combatants to avoid breaches in the laws of war that 
accompanied guerilla violence and to tap into a potentially valuable 
military resource. Before the PRA, the War Department had taken the 
position that “[g]uerrilla companies are not recognized as part of the 
military organization of the Confederate States, and cannot be authorized 
by this Department.”41 Witt in Lincoln’s Code underscores the reticence 
of General Lee and Confederate President Jefferson Davis to deploy 
partisan rangers, noting that Union occupation left Confederate leaders 
with little practical choice but to hope to make use of unconventional 
combatants through the PRA.42 There may have been doubts, but the 
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Confederate leadership was willing to back the position that partisan 
ranger service was not violative of the laws of war within a year of the 
war’s outbreak. Confederate leaders had already embraced the use of 
privateers, which may have made them comfortable with asserting the 
laws of war and giving partisan rangers the same privileges as 
conventional soldiers. Privateers were functionally similar to partisan 
rangers because both could keep plunder from the enemy, unlike 
conventional combatants.43 Although the PRA organized partisan rangers 
as conventional units, the partisan rangers’ operational brief differed 
significantly from conventional soldiers. Partisan ranger service was 
meant to appeal to those who would have otherwise taken up arms as 
guerrillas, not those amenable to conventional service. Colonel John 
Imboden’s recruitment advertisement in the Richmond Examiner displays 
the expectations of partisan rangers: 
My purpose is to wage thermoactive warfare against our brutal 
invaders and their domestic allies; to hang about their camp and 
shoot down every sentinel, picket, courier and wagon-driver we can 
find; to watch opportunities for attacking convoys and forage trains, 
and thus rendering the country so unsafe that they will not dare to 
move except in large bodies. Our own Virginia traitors—men of the 
Pierpoint and Carlisle stamp—will receive our special regards. . . . 
It is only men I want—men who will pull the trigger on a Yankee 
with as much alacrity as they would on a mad dog; men whose 
consciences will not be disturbed at the sight of vandal carcase.44 
Conventional soldiers were expected to engage exclusively with enemy 
combatants through accepted forms—i.e., a pitched battle in which agents 
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of the state fought one another for state purposes wherein combatants were 
clearly delineated. Partisan rangers targeted non-combat support personnel, 
Union sympathizers, and Union soldiers behind enemy lines; creating a 
blend of vigilante, police, and conventional military activity. Officially, the 
Confederate government outfitted partisan rangers, but in reality, the 
majority of supplies, ammunition, weapons, and horses came from captured 
Union troops.45 To be differentiated from guerrillas, partisan rangers were 
supposed to wear Confederate uniforms. “Uniform,” however, was defined 
loosely in practice, so partisan rangers could be readily, and often were, 
mistaken for guerillas.46 
Through 1862, partisan rangers were held in high esteem amongst the 
Confederate leadership. A clerk in the Confederate War Department 
attested that President Davis was amenable to subordinating conscription 
to encourage partisan ranger recruitment in some areas: “[T]he President 
intends suspending the Conscription Act in Western Virginia, for the 
purpose, no doubt, of organizing an army of Partisan Rangers in that 
direction.”47 Responding to a request for reinforcements by a general 
commanding conventional troops in southwestern Virginia, General Lee 
suggested, “[I]f you can raise a ranger force, under such competent officers 
as you may select and nominate, they will be commissioned by the 
President, and every exertion shall be made to arm the rangers as fast as 
they are raised.”48 Lee’s order outlines the parameters envisioned for 
partisan rangers under the laws of war and in service to the Confederacy.  
As a supplement for conventional soldiers under the command of army 
officers, partisan rangers were legitimized as an arm of the conventional 
military. Because partisan rangers would be utilized for an array of 
conventional military services, the laws of war should treat them in the 
same way as conventional soldiers. Lee knew his position was legally 
novel—evidenced by his attaching of the PRA to his order—cementing 
the legal status the Confederate sovereign conferred on the partisan 
rangers. A further caveat by Lee—that the commander should personally 
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select competent officers—highlights a concern that since partisan rangers 
did not operate as conventional units, the competence of their officers was 
paramount to prevent partisan rangers from turning into guerrillas. In the 
eyes of Lee and other conventional officers, the legal status of partisan 
rangers was contingent on practicality. If partisan rangers did not 
accomplish their practical purpose by operating as disciplined units in 
concert with conventional forces, partisan rangers would slide outside the 
realm of legitimacy the PRA created.49 
III. UNION RESPONSE TO THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT 
The prevailing orthodox position’s disdain for unconventional 
combatants informed Union perceptions and treatment of partisan rangers.50 
References to unconventional combatants by Union commanders and 
officials are loaded with connotations that unconventional combat is 
barbaric, obviating Union officers’ duty to treat unconventional combatants 
as soldiers under the laws of war. In mid-March of 1862, West Virginia’s 
provisional governor, Francis Pierpont, wrote Lincoln to suggest that those 
engaged in “guerrilla warfare”—this nomenclature generally captured all 
unconventional combatants—be treated as murderers at war’s end.51 Some 
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Union commanders concluded that since unconventional combatants’ 
behavior abandoned the standards of civilized white society, unconventional 
combatants were not only criminals for breaching laws of war, but also 
undeserving of civil and military due process. A Union Assistant Secretary 
of War suggested to an officer stationed in Kentucky in May of 1862, “If 
guerrillas were shot without challenge as enemies of mankind their bands 
would soon disperse, and the assassination of sentinels and teamsters and 
other barbarities practiced in irregular warfare would soon cease.”52 That 
officer replied a few days later that he had given directions to shoot any 
unconventional combatants caught tampering with his supply lines.53 
George Crook, commander of a renowned counter-guerrilla unit, 
transposed the lessons he had learned fighting Native Americans in the 
West to fight unconventional combatants in Virginia, recalling later: 
Their [“bushwhackers”] suppression became a military necessity, 
as they caused us to detach much of our active service for escorts, 
and even then no one was safe. . . . The question was how to get 
rid of them. Being fresh from Indian country where I had more or 
less experience with that kind of warfare, I set to work organizing 
for the task. I selected apt officers, and scattered them through the 
country to learn it and all the people in it, and particularly the 
bushwhackers, their haunts, etc.54 
Native Americans were not practitioners of laws of war orthodoxy. That 
tactics used to fight Native Americans were necessary to fight partisan 
rangers further evidenced that partisan rangers fell outside the sphere of 
laws of war orthodoxy’s protection for captured soldiers and enemy 
civilians.   
As George Crook advanced through the ranks in the Union army 
operating in western Virginia, his attitude contributed to the development 
of punitive counter-guerrilla practices that flew in the face of the limiting 
spirit of orthodox laws of war by holding civilians accountable for 
unconventional activity.55  
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The PRA presupposed a legal distinction between partisan rangers and 
other unconventional combatants, which elicited disdain from Union 
officers. Union General John C. Frémont in April of 1862 reported to 
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton that in western Virginia, “a systematic 
plan of guerrilla warfare has been arranged and organized . . . under the 
sanction of the Confederate Congress and the rebel legislature at 
Richmond. Those who have enlisted with the rebels are to be transferred 
to these ranger companies, as they are called.”56 Brigadier General Robert 
H. Milroy characterized the Union’s rejection of the PRA, stating the 
purpose of partisan rangers was to rob, plunder, and devastate western 
Virginia based on “blank commissions.”57 The New York Times bemoaned 
the burdens of legally distinguishing partisans from other unconventionals:  
They have urged all along that bushwhacking and guerrillaism 
were legitimate and proper means of war; and that when guerrillas 
and bushwhackers were captured, they must be treated by us as 
prisoners of war . . . . The hypocrisy of the rebel Government in 
this, as in everything else, is now evident . . . . It is time we adopted 
the same policy in reference to rebel bushwhackers in Western 
Virginia and Missouri.58  
The North’s most popular publication, Harper’s Weekly, characterized 
unconventional combat as the product of “the four highest crimes in the 
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calendar—murder, rape, robbery, and arson.”59 The publication said of 
General Frémont, who hanged several unconventional combatants without 
trial, “[his] method of treatment in Western Virginia will be the surest.”60 
Refusal to recognize partisan rangers was a refusal to accept the 
Confederacy’s prerogative to challenge the prevailing orthodox position 
on unconventional combatants.61 
Desiring a coherent position on partisan rangers, Union General-in-
Chief Henry W. Halleck approached Francis Lieber for legal advice on 
how the partisan rangers should be classified and treated under the laws of 
war.62 Halleck’s letter requesting Lieber’s insight exudes contempt and 
frustration with the PRA:  
[R]ebel authorities claim the right to send men, in the garb of 
peaceful citizens, to waylay and attack our troops . . . to destroy 
property and persons within our lines. They demand that such 
persons be treated as ordinary belligerents, and that when captured 
they have extended to them the same rights as other prisoners of 
war.63 
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F. MARSZALEK, COMMANDER OF ALL LINCOLN’S ARMIES: A LIFE OF GENERAL 
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In Halleck’s eyes, unconventional conduct by partisan rangers—i.e., 
attacking soldiers behind lines not in uniform—negated any legal claim 
partisan rangers had to be treated as conventional soldiers. 
The issue for Halleck was not academic; Confederate authorities 
threatened that if partisan rangers were punished as “marauders and 
spies”—as Halleck gives the distinct impression he would like to do— 
“they will retaliated by executing our prisoners of war in their 
possession.”64 Lieber responded with a detailed treatise, Guerilla Parties 
Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War.65 In the 
treatise, Lieber classified unconventional combatants and explained the 
legal standing of each class and its attendant rights under the laws of war. 
Lieber extrapolated from recent Euro-American military history to opine 
that the laws of war similarly recognized sanctioned partisans as 
conventional soldiers.  
Heretofore, Lieber noted, the term “partisan” had been “vaguely used” 
in orthodox laws of war.66 The proper definition, Lieber argues, pertains 
to government authorized partisans, who were simply “bodies detached 
from the main army.”67 Similar to militia or levies en masse, sanctioned 
partisans were imbued with government authority, even if not engaged in 
the activity of conventional units. Guerrillas, on the other hand, “who form 
no integrant part of the organized army . . . take up arms and lay them 
down at intervals, and carry out petty war (guerilla) chiefly by raids, 
extortion, destruction and massacre,” did not enjoy the privileges of 
conventional soldiers under the laws of war.68 If captured, “in fair fight 
and open warfare,” guerrillas, Lieber reasoned, should be treated “as the 
regular partisan is,” until specific crimes are proven; conventional soldiers 
or partisan rangers were not subject to a criminal determination when 
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 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 11. 
 67. Id. Jon Fabian Witt points out that Lieber’s classification tacitly rebuked 
laws of war orthodoxy by acknowledging the complex realities of 19th century 
conflict necessitated classification beyond that orthodox thinking provided. WITT, 
supra note 1, at 194. 
 68. LIEBER, supra note 63, at 18–19. Present throughout Lieber’s 
commentary on the distinction between partisans and guerrillas is the assumption 
that a lack of organization inexorably leads to violence against prisoners and 
civilians. Because guerrillas are not supplied as formal units, Lieber reasons “they 
cannot otherwise subsist than by rapine, and almost always degenerate into simple 
robbers or brigands.” Id. at 19.  




captured.69 Lieber chided Halleck for failing to recognize a distinction 
between guerrillas and partisans, and recommended that partisans be 
considered as part of the conventional army: 
The partisan leader commands a corps whose object is to injure 
the enemy by action separate from that of his own main army; the 
partisan acts chiefly upon the enemy’s lines of connection and 
communication, and outside of or beyond the lines of operation of 
his own army, in the rear and on flanks of the enemy . . . but he is 
part and parcel of the army, and, as such, considered entitled to 
the privileges of the laws of war . . . .70 
Guerrillas’ operations were disorderly and random, but government 
control put partisan rangers on a different plane alongside conventional 
soldiers according to Lieber. Halleck gave the treatise his stamp of 
approval, ordering 5,000 copies be distributed to the Union army.71 A few 
months later, Lieber restated the key points from his treatise in Lincoln’s 
Code.72 What had begun as a project to clarify the status quo culminated 
in Lincoln’s Code, a significant revision of laws of war, by advancing the 
concept of military necessity.  
Union commanders bristled at the Lincoln Code’s directive to grant 
partisan rangers prisoner-of-war status. General Halleck ignored Lieber, 
excusing retaliation by Union troops against partisan rangers writ large. 
Halleck’s action was contrary to Lincoln’s Code because partisan rangers 
did not engage in “legitimate warfare” in October of 1863.73 Halleck 
remarked, “It is not surprising that our people get exasperated at such men 
and shoot them down when they can. Moreover, men who act in this 
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 73. 29 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. II, supra note 17, at 397. 




manner in disguise, and within our lines, have, under the laws of civilized 
war, forfeited their lives.”74 In this same message, Halleck named partisan 
rangers “guerrillas and robber bands” for refusing to fight in uniforms as 
conventional soldiers and for returning to their homes to feign non-
involvement in battle.75 In a similar tone, Brigadier General Edward Wild, 
who commanded Union troops in southern Virginia and northern North 
Carolina, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of four counties in North 
Carolina: 
All guerrillas are on a par with pirates, and are to be treated as 
such. The fact of their being paid by the State, and being called 
‘Partisan Rangers,’ does not help the matter. Neither the Governor 
of the State nor Jefferson Davis can legalize such a style of 
warfare.76 
By the latter half of the war, summary execution of unconventional 
combatants—including partisan rangers—was increasingly common.77 In 
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a “gang of cut throats and robbers.” 43 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. I, supra 
note 17, at 508–09. During the summer of 1864 campaign in the Shenandoah 
Valley, some Pennsylvania soldiers felt that, because of the disparate ratio 
between those Mosby’s men had killed rather than wounded, Mosby had crossed 
the line demarcating civilized warfare. Colonel Charles Russell Lowell, 
commanding a brigade in Merritt’s division, offered mixed emotions about the 
Union’s policies towards guerrillas to his wife on October 5, 1864:  
Lieutenant Meigs was shot by a guerrilla, and by order the village of 
Dayton and everything for several miles around was burned. I am very 
glad my Brigade had no hand in it. Though if it will help end 
bushwhacking, I approve it, and I would cheerfully assist in making this 
whole Valley a desert from Staunton northward,–for that would have, I 
am sure, an important effect on the campaign of the Spring,–but in 
partial burnings I see less justice and less propriety. I was sorry enough 
the other day that my Brigade should have had a part in the hanging and 
shooting of some of Mosby’s men who were taken–I believe that some 




spite of the pains Lieber took to distinguish between partisans and 
guerrillas, disagreements persisted.78 Such disagreements rose to the 
highest military stratosphere. After Union troops captured some partisan 
rangers, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, commander of 
Confederate forces around Vicksburg, Mississippi, felt compelled to 
explain to his Union counterpart, “these officers and men are as much a 
part of the C.S. Army as are any others composing it and as much entitled 
to the benefits of the cartel as any of your prisoners whom I now hold.”79  
The U.S. Congress even got involved in June 1864 when Ohio 
Representative James Garfield introduced “The Bill to Provide for the 
More Speedy Punishment of Guerrilla Marauders,” which passed on July 
2, 1864.80 The proposed bill licensed departmental commanders and 
general officers “to carry into execution all sentences against guerrillas for 
robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and for 
violation of the laws and customs of wars.”81 In the Senate, Thomas 
Henricks proposed an amendment that “the term ‘guerrillas’ therein 
contained should not be held to include persons employed in the 
authorized service of the enemy,” which ostensibly excluded partisan 
ranger commanders’ broad license to mete out punishment.82 Another 
Senator floated an amendment that the term “guerillas” did not include 
those “in the authorized service” of the Confederacy.83 The Senate rejected 
this last condition, and passed the Act with a carve out for partisan rangers, 
ostensibly reconciled with Lincoln’s Code. 
                                                                                                             
punishment was deserved–but I hardly think we were within the laws of 
war, and any violation of them opens the door for all sorts of barbarity. 
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whom Union authorities held after his capture for allegedly breaking his parole. 
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IV. THE REPEAL OF THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT 
A convergence of factors sapped support for the partisan rangers. The 
PRA had not eliminated the guerrilla problem by channeling 
unconventional combat into a disciplined medium that was useful to the 
conventional Confederate army; guerrilla activity persisted throughout the 
Confederacy. Conventional army demands for conscripts to replenish the 
lost grew louder, prompting revisions to the PRA soon after its passage.84 
Initially, the potential conscripts had the choice between partisan ranger 
and conventional service. This choice proved appealing to those desirous 
of avoiding the conventional battlefield, but Congress amended the PRA 
to make conscripts ineligible for partisan ranger service.85  
On September 1, 1862, a senator successfully proposed that Congress 
amend the PRA so that partisan rangers could only recruit “where the 
companies or regiments composing the military force of said district are 
filled to the maximum number.”86 Congress continued to debate the 
efficacy of partisan rangers and the PRA’s effect on conscription after 
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these amendments.87 A growing chorus of army officers’ complaints 
exacerbated lawmakers’ doubts about the PRA. Echoing these doubts, a 
“Report of the Secretary of War” on January 3, 1863, noted: 
The policy of organizing corps of Partizan Rangers has not been 
approved by experience. The permanency of their engagements 
and their consequent inability to disband and reassemble at call, 
precludes their usefulness as mere guerrillas. While the 
comparative independence of their military relations, and the 
peculiar rewards allowed them for captures, induce much license 
and many irregularities. They have not unfrequently excited more 
odium and done more damage with friends than enemies.88 
The Secretary of War went on to discuss the possibility of converting 
existing partisan ranger units into conventional service. A letter to the 
editor of the Richmond Examiner from “a cavalrymen” shared the 
sentiments, declaring “the best interest of the service demands that all 
partisan organizations to be broken up . . . . Men are deserting daily and 
joining unconventional bands.”89 Although not necessarily a bellwether 
for public opinion, this letter suggests that people beyond the Confederate 
military and political brass began to question the PRA. 
Calls from the highest echelons of the Confederate military in early 
1864 sealed the PRA’s fate. Shortly after a joint expedition with a partisan 
ranger unit in western Virginia, Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser—
who purportedly had exchanged bitter words with the partisan ranger 
commander about the proper role of partisan rangers and horses—wrote 
General Lee, condemning partisan ranger service and calling for 
disbandment: 
Without discipline, order, or organization they roam broadcast 
over the country, a band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering, 
and doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror 
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to the citizens and an injury to the cause. They never fight; can’t 
be made to fight. Their leaders are generally brave, but few of the 
men are good soldiers, and have engaged in this business for the 
sake of gain. The effect upon the service is bad, and I think, if 
possible, it should be corrected.90 
General Lee and Major General J. E. B. Stuart, Lee’s trusted cavalry 
commander, endorsed Rosser’s suggestion in late January of 1864.91 The 
Department of War forwarded the Rosser, Stuart, and Lee opinions to the 
chairman of the Congressional Military Committee on January 30, 1864.92 
Elaborating further on his opinion of partisan rangers in a report to the 
Confederate Adjutant and Inspector General in April of 1864, Lee wrote: 
“Experience has convinced me that it is almost impossible, under the best 
officers even, to have discipline in these bands of partisan rangers, or to 
prevent them from becoming an injury instead of a benefit to the 
service.”93 The broad condemnation by the military high command 
undoubtedly affirmed opinions of many supporters of the prevailing 
orthodox position—unconventional combatants were uncontrollable and 
outside the bounds of legality, regardless of whether they carried a 
government commission or not. 
On January 14, 1864, a representative introduced a bill to repeal the 
PRA.94 The House of Representatives and the Senate debated the 
particulars for a month.95 The final bill, which went into effect on February 
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17, 1864, converted mounted units into regular cavalry, united other bands 
with existing regular commands, and permitted the Secretary of War to 
exempt such units as he deemed proper from the Act’s repeal.96 Only two 
partisan ranger units, John S. Mosby’s and John H. McNeill’s commands, 
lived up to Confederate leaders’ expectations enough to escape 
disbandment.97 
CONCLUSION 
Unconventional guerrilla violence during the Civil War produced 
uniquely challenging legal quandaries about Confederate sovereignty and 
the Union military jurisdiction, and influenced Union treatment of 
civilians, creating questions about the boundaries of the laws of war. The 
embarrassment resulting from the PRA, between and among Union 
soldiers and Confederates, forced engagement with laws of war 
orthodoxy. The Confederacy ultimately reverted to the orthodoxy by 
repealing the PRA because the partisan ranger experiment had not born 
fruit, vindicating the orthodox-informed position that promoting 
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unconventional units would only promote inappropriate violence amongst 
combatants and civilians. Although its field commanders maintained a 
strictly orthodox view of partisan rangers, the Lincoln administration 
stepped away from orthodoxy by adopting Lincoln’s Code. The PRA’s 
failure highlights the Union leadership’s success with Lincoln’s Code and 
its import as a framework to reconcile those themes. Against this 
backdrop, the PRA’s enactment and repeal adds to the understanding of 
the dynamic mosaic of competing legal positions during the Civil War. 
